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The effectiveness of antibiotics in treating bacterial infections is decreasing in China because of the widespread
development of resistant organisms. Although China has enacted a number of regulations to address this problem, but
the impact is very limited. This paper investigates the implementation of these regulations through the lens of complex
adaptive systems (CAS). It presents the findings from reviews of relevant policy documents and published papers. The
paper identifies different types of agent and explores their interaction with regard to the use of antibiotics and their
responses to changes of the regulations. It focuses particularly on the impact of perverse financial incentives on overall
patterns of use of antibiotics. Implications for the possibilities of nonlinear results, interactive relationships, and new
pathways of policy implementation are discussed. The paper concludes that policy-makers need to better understand
the objectives, incentives and potential adaptive behaviors of the agents when they implement interventions to
improve antibiotic use and reduce the risk of emergence of resistant organisms.
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China accounts for one-fifth of the world’s population and
has made significant progress in improving public health
since the establishment of the People’s of Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949. Life expectancy has more than doubled
from 35 years before 1949 to 74.8 years in 2010, and infant
mortality has fallen from 200‰ before 1949 to 9.5‰ in
2013 [1]. The widespread use of antibiotics and the conse-
quent reduction in rates of infectious disease has been an
important contributor to this gain [2]. In recent years
there has been growing evidence of bacterial infections
that are resistant to the available antibiotics in many
low-and-middle income countries (LMICs) [3]. This in-
cludes China, which is experiencing a growing problem
with antimicrobial resistance [4, 5].High levels of antibiotic use
There is evidence of high levels of antibiotic use in
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2007 and 2009, found that the number of antibiotic pre-
scriptions was double that recommended by the WHO [6].
A study of prescriptions for outpatients and inpatients
from 23 cities and 16 rural primary health care centers be-
tween 2009 and 2011 showed that 52.9 % of the outpa-
tients were prescribed antibiotics, but only 39.4 % needed
them on the basis of the clinical condition [7]. The same
study found that 77.5 % of inpatients received antibiotics,
but only 24.6 % were prescribed appropriately. Another
study in two rural counties showed that 43 % of patients
were prescribed antibiotics unnecessarily [8]. A recent
study showed that combination use of antibiotics was
found in 55.0 % of antibiotic prescriptions [7]. One study
in 2008 found that 19 % of prescriptions for antibiotics
were for two and 2 % for three or more [9]. A large propor-
tion of antibiotics are administered by injection [7] includ-
ing at village clinics [10].Antimicrobial resistance
Surveillance data show a growing problem with anti-
microbial resistance. The China Bacterial Resistance Sur-
veillance Study Group (BRSSG) found resistant strainsle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
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Table 1 Main antibiotic regulations and strategies in China
• Guidelines for antibiotic use in clinical practice, enacted in 2004 as the
first national guidelines for the clinical application of antibacterial drugs,
categorizing antibiotics as non-restricted, restricted, and special use, NHFPC,
SATCM, HDGLM
• Measures to forbid retail pharmacies from selling antibiotics without
prescriptions, 2004, CFDA
• Notice on establishing a surveillance net for the clinical application of
antibacterial drugs and Mohnarin, 2005, NHFPC, SATCM, HDGLM
• Notice on further strengthening the management of the clinical
application of antibacterial drugs, 2008, the General Office of NHFPC
• Notice on the management of the clinical application of antibacterial
drugs, 2009, the General Office of NHFPC
• National Essential Medicines Policy (NEMP), 2009, the State Council of
China. Advocating prioritizing the use of essential medicines and
canceling the 15 % mark-up policy in all government-owned primary
healthcare(PHC) facilities by the end of 2011.
• Measures for the Management of the Clinical Application of Antibacterial
Drugs, 2012, NHFPC
• Three year national special campaign on the clinical application of
antibacterial drugs, 2011-2013, NHFPC
• National education program of “66 Items Related to Citizen’s Health
Literacy in China”, viewed as a program that every citizen should know
basic health information, 2008(revised in 2015), NHFPC
• Health China Propaganda Program, 2013, NHDPC, CFDA and CAST
Source: government documents
NHFPC -the National Health and Family Planning Commission
SATCM -the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine
HDGLM-the Health Department of General Logistic Minister
CAST -the China Association for Science and Technology
CFDA-the China Food and Drug Administration
Mohnarin- Ministry of Health National Antimicrobial Resistance
Surveillance Net
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(R + I), and AREF during the early 2000s [11]. The National
Antibacterial Resistance Surveillance Net (Mohnarin) was
founded in 2005 by the Ministry of Health to monitor
nationwide bacterial resistance. It began in 109 hospitals
and has subsequently been extended to 1427 hospitals. Its
2004-05 Report showed that the prevalence of antibiotic re-
sistance was much higher in China than in North America
and Europe [5]. Subsequent reports have shown a growing
trend in antibiotic resistance. The 2006-07 Report indicated
that multiple-drug resistant bacteria, such as MRSA,
ESBLs(+) enterobacteria, and non-fermenters, were com-
mon throughout the country [12]. The incidence of MRSA
increased from 56.1 % in 2006-07 to 67.6 % in 2008, and
the proportion of E. coli producing ESBLs went up from
35.3 % in 2006-07 to 56.0 % in 2008 and 70 % in the follow-
ing years [13–15].
Main antibiotic regulations and strategies
China has taken many measures to address antimicrobial
resistance, often in response to global developments. It is-
sued a Guideline for Antibacterial Use in Clinical Practice
in 2004, in response to the 2001 WHO Global Strategy for
the Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance [16]. In 2012
it enacted the Measures for the Management of the Clinical
Application of Antibacterial Drugs soon after the WHO
made “Antimicrobial resistance: no action today, no cure
tomorrow” the key health issue of the 2011 World Health
Day [17]. Table 1 summarizes measures that have been
taken to address the problem of antimicrobial resistance.
These interventions have had some success, but antibiotics
abuse is still common in China. Although, NHFPC surveil-
lance data showed a fall in the percentages of antibiotics used
for both inpatients and outpatients between 2010 and 2014,
overuse of antibiotics and IV infusions was still a major prob-
lem [18]. Total drug expenditure frommore than 770 surveil-
lance sites nation-wide almost doubled between 2010 and
2013. Reynolds et al. [19] argue that the implementation of na-
tional guidelines on antibiotic use has been fragmented and
incomplete, andChina hasmade only limited progress in con-
taining antibiotic resistance [19]. Li et al. [6] argue that over-
sight of antibiotics use is lax. A manager at the NHFPC
indicated that China does not yet have a well-organized sys-
tem to promote the rational use of antibiotics [18].
Many studies have attempted to understand the imple-
mentation of these regulations and strategies. Zhang et al.
[20] investigated outpatient antibiotic use by pediatric hos-
pitals and found that the guidelines have a positive impact
on the use of narrow-spectrum antibiotics but not of
broad-spectrum ones. Jin et al. [10] used a backward map-
ping methodology to explore users’ perceptions and their
impacts on technology regulation. Li et al. [6] argued that
removing financial incentives from prescribing, as well as
more vigorous supervision of the pharmaceutical marketand prescribing behavior were needed in order to curb
overuse of antibiotics. Gu [21] argued that the underlying
cause of over-prescribing was inappropriate government
regulation of prices for health services and medicine.
Liang et al. [22] studied the impact of government struc-
ture reform on antibiotic prescriptions in community
health centers.
These publications bring different perspectives for ana-
lyzing the influence of regulation on antibiotic use. One
way to bring these perspectives together is by viewing
antibiotic use as a complex system [16, 23], in which many
actors at different government levels and in a variety of in-
stitutions, including hospitals, pharmacies, manufacturers,
insurance agents, and consumers, respond to interven-
tions by adapting their behaviors in ways that have posi-
tive and negative effects [24]. Moreover, some actors
function largely outside the health regulatory framework
[25]. This paper applies the concept of a complex adaptive
system (CAS) to analyze the implementation of regula-
tions and strategies regarding antibiotic use.
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One important element of a complex adaptive system is
the existence of many interacting agents, capable of self-
organization and responding to disruptions through inter-
active behaviors [26, 27, 28]. The interactions between
agents are complex and dynamic so it is difficult to con-
trol or predict the result of a specific intervention [26, 27].
There are feedback loops and interdependencies between
parts of the system, and there is often no direct cause and
effect relationship [29, 30]. In a complex world, strategy is
a series of processes for managing change [31].
The WHO defines a health system as ‘all organizations,
people and actions whose primary intent is to promote,
restore or maintain health’ [32]. There is an increasing
recognition of the degree to which health systems exhibit
the characteristics of a complex adaptive system [26, 33].
This can explain why an insignificant stimulus can some-
times create rapid change at scale and why at other times
major interventions result in modest outcomes or unpre-
dicted consequences [26, 30]. Health interventions, such
as legislative and educational efforts, are inherently com-
plicated to design and evaluate correctly and complex sci-
ence can provide a useful framework for designing and
implementing them [34, 35].
A growing body of literature applies the concept of
CAS to health systems and their transformation. There
have been publications on the design of primary care
practice [30, 36–38], practical solutions in clinical care
[39], designing evaluation programs for health interven-
tions [34, 35, 39], explaining the relationship between man-
agement practice and health outcomes in nursing homes
[40] and variation and change in family practices [41].
These studies frame the interacting parts and agents in the
health system in different ways in analyzing how adaptive
activities and interactive relationships influence the imple-
mentation of policy interventions.
Regulation of antibiotic use has to balance the need to
ensure that people have access to appropriate antibiotics,
when they need them, whilst preserving the efficacy of
these products, as a global public good [42, 43]. Overuse of
antibiotics results from a combination of inappropriate fi-
nancial incentives, lack of surveillance information on re-
sistance and the understandings of users and suppliers of
these products, amongst other things [23]. The coordin-
ation of different professions and authorities, decentralized
organizations with regional groups, and news media are
important factors for successfully changing antibiotic use
[44]. A systems approach can help with the identification
of drivers and obstacles to effective interventions [23].
China’s health system is experiencing a number of con-
tinuous and rapid reforms. It is important to situate an ef-
fort to alter antibiotic use in this context. Several studies
have contributed to our understanding of this context
using the concept of CAS. Bloom et al. [45] explore healthmarket regulation and suggest approaches proven to work
well in one context may not be effective in other contexts.
They argue that regulatory strategies need to be based on
an understanding of local institutions. Xiao et al. [24] use
the lens of CAS to evaluate the implementation of essen-
tial drug policies in Chinese rural areas. The authors
found that divergent and unpredicted outcomes emerged
because of the interaction between agents. Zhang et al.
[46] apply CAS theory and resilience thinking to an ana-
lysis of the evolution of the system of rural health finance.
They argue that policy development and implementation
is the result of the responses of many interacting agents to
a dynamic context and the attempts of government to
respond to these adaptations.
This paper explores the adaptive behavior of different
agents, interacting relationships, and the incentives likely
to influence the implementation of policies to improve
antibiotic use. It views providers and users of antibiotics
as key actors in the system and explores the impact of
their adaptation to new government regulations. It focuses
on antibiotics for human use rather than for animal hus-
bandry and aquaculture. This paper does not consider re-
lated issues, such as environmental spread of antibiotics
and antibiotic-resistant bacteria, infection prevention and
control, sanitation and hygiene, large-scale migration, bac-
teria culturing in laboratories, and rapid diagnosis [19].
Methods
This paper explores the implementation of antibiotic
regulations in China as a case study that identifies and
analyzes factors that explain the limited impact on anti-
biotic use in a complex context. The data were collected
from the following sources: (1) national policy documents
about antibiotic use, and related polices in a broader area,
(2) published studies in the scientific literature, (3) and
other documents.
Figure 1 presents a framework that can be used to
analyze the implementation of antibiotic regulations.
The key agents are involved in the relationship between
supply and demand. The factors that support the health
market can set a positive or negative incentive structure.
Under the totality of an outside incentive structure and
policy intervention, all types of agents will adapt them-
selves to the environment through interactive behavior
and strive to protect their interests, which may be con-
sistent or contradictory to the policy goal. Intended or
unintended outcomes may appear.
Findings and discussion
Many agents in the system
Many types of agents, including governments, producers
and distributors of pharmaceuticals, hospitals, patients,
insurance agents and many informal actors are involved
in the system of antibiotic use [45].
Fig. 1 Conceptualising implementation of regulations and other strategies in CAS
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is responsible for making, implementing, and regulating
policy. According to Fang [47], Chinese health care regula-
tory institutions include the system of public health admin-
istration, the auditing system, the price control regulations,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Industry
and Commerce Administration (ICA) system, and other
informal regulatory arrangements. In the context of anti-
biotic use, the public health administration system is
responsible for most of the direct regulations and strategies
mentioned above; the FDA oversees organizations and
individuals who address buying, selling, and prescribing
drugs based on Drug Management Law and its Implemen-
tation Statute; the Price Control System establishes the
prices of health services and drugs (at present, the govern-
ment is exploring ending price regulation of most of medi-
cines) and the ICA system has the duty to oversee private
health facilities.
Many Providers and Multiple Channels to Users. All
types of producers, distributors, health facilities, and
retail pharmacies can be seen as antibiotic providers.
There are six types of medicine circulation path from medi-
cine providers to patients: (1) producers-distributors-health
facilities-patients, (2) producers-distributors-patients, (3)
producers- distributors-retailers-patients (4) producers-
health facilities-patients, (5) producers-retailers-patients, (6)
producers-patients [48]. Before 2009, most drugs were dis-
tributed from producers to wholesalers, then to hospitals or
retail pharmacies, and finally to patients. Since the NEMP
was implemented in the 2009 health system reform, indi-
vidual health facilities have been forbidden from purchasingessential drugs directly from producers or wholesalers, but
they are allowed to purchase through provincial public
bidding [49]. By the end of 2015, there were 466,546 drug
trading enterprises, including 13,508 wholesalers, 4,981 pri-
vate retail chain enterprises, 204,895 chain drugstores and
243,162 standalone drugstores [50]. There were 985,000
healthcare facilities in 2014 [51], and their total expenditure
accounted for 62.56 % of the National Total Expenditure
on Health(TEH) in 2013 [52]. Public facilities have a
dominant position, accounting for 86 % of hospital beds.
Pharmacies owned by hospitals account for approximately
80 % of the drug market in terms of value [49]. Health facil-
ities have a bilateral monopoly position in the Chinese
medicine market, which means they have both a buyer-
monopoly position because of powerful purchasing ability,
and a seller-monopoly position because of dominating
prescription rights [21]. Drug producers and distribu-
tors are not only the main suppliers of antibiotics to
health facilities and retail pharmacies, they are also in-
creasingly selling directly to patients through the inter-
net. Retail pharmacies are becoming important supplier
of antibiotics. The proportion of their drug sales in na-
tional total drug sales has a steadily rising trend, in-
creasing to 30.14 % in 2012 [52]. Other semi-formal or
informal providers, such as village clinics and barefoot
doctors, and some illegal private clinics and pharmacies
add complexity to the system.
Patients are key actors. Their understandings of the
appropriate use of antibiotics strongly influence patterns
of use [10]. Self-medication is common because it allows
people to avoid the crowding and high costs of hospitals.
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The payment system can influence doctors’ behaviors.
For example, Fee for service, in which providers are
retrospectively reimbursed for each service rendered,
can cause over-treatment.
Confusing and complicating incentive mechanisms
The public health administration, including central and
local health and family planning administration depart-
ments, is the main government arrangement for the
regulation of health services. It also acts as the admin-
istrative leader and advocate of public healthcare
facilities. This means that the health administration de-
partment needs to balance conflicting objectives be-
tween maintaining the operation and income of public
health facilities and supervising their activities to meet
people’s interests.
Since the beginning of the transition from a planned to
a market economy, government subsidies to public
health-care facilities have been reduced substantially,
while the government has set the prices for health services
in public facilities below the economic cost. Health facility
managers have had to find other ways to meet their finan-
cial needs [21]. In 1992, the State Council proposed that
healthcare facilities should “rely on government subsidies
for capital investment, but rely on user charges and drug
mark-ups for operational activities”. User charges and
drug mark-ups became major sources of hospital finance
[49]. Drug sales have become a very important source of
revenue. These market-like activities have created strong
incentives for selling high volumes of expensive drugs and
diagnostic tests.
Until recently, secondary and tertiary general hospitals
have been permitted to add a 15 % mark-up to the
wholesale price of drugs, and in practice, the mark-up
has been higher. This has created an incentive for health
facilities to prescribe more medicines and also has en-
couraged the facilities to purchase drugs at relatively
high prices and prescribe more expensive products, ra-
ther than the cheapest antibiotics. The producers and
distributors of pharmaceuticals have sought profit by
winning bids for government procurement. The 15 %
mark-up policy meant they would do their best to per-
suade public hospitals to purchase expensive drugs and
win the bid at a higher price, often offering kick-backs
[21]. It is not surprising that many inexpensive, but ef-
fective, drugs have disappeared from the market because
there was little incentive for drug producers and distrib-
utors to supply them. The National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) has conducted specific
types of medicine price-reduction activities more than
30 times since 1997, but they have had little long-term
impact, because of the adaptation of agents to the al-
tered incentives [21].In recent years, primary healthcare facilities in China
have been required to eliminate the 15 % mark-up, in
order to cut the linkage between prescriptions and rev-
enue generation, but the effect has not been straight for-
ward. There have been a few studies of the effect of the
National Essential Medicines Policy (NEMP) on the use
of antibiotics in primary health care facilities. The effect
has been moderate, although the results of these studies
are inconsistent. Shan [53] and Yang [54] found that the
NEMP had a positive effect on improving rational usage
of antibiotics, although irrational usage still remained
serious.. Jin et al. [55] indicated that the NEMP had sig-
nificantly increased the joint usage of antibiotics, ste-
roids and intravenous infusion in township health care,
after evaluating 76,451 prescriptions based on a pre-post
with non-equivalent control design and logistic regres-
sion. Song et al. [56] collected 28,651 prescriptions from
146 township health centers in a field survey conducted
in four provinces of China in 2010-2011 and found little
impact of the NEMP on the average number of antibi-
otics per prescription, but the percentage of prescrip-
tions including antibiotics decreased a little (from
60.26 % to 58.48 %). This paper argues that moderate ef-
fect is due to the payment mechanism that was put by
reimbursing facilities on the basis of average drug profits
in the preceding three years.
The public health administrative agency has taken the
lead in formulating most of the regulations and strat-
egies contained in Table 1. As the sponsor of public
health facilities, it has the incentive to ensure their status
and the income of the healthcare workers. This may
have limited their efforts to implement the regulations
they formulated. Although the FDA and ICA systems
are also involved in regulating drug use, neither are re-
sponsible for how medicines and drugs are prescribed
and used at health facilities [47].
Medical insurance payment mechanisms have a differ-
ent incentive structure. For a long time, fee-for-service
has been the dominant way for reimbursing healthcare
costs. This payment mechanism allows physicians to
prescribe more treatments, and patients have no in-
centive to refuse excessive healthcare services. A
number of reform efforts have been attempted to re-
duce its influence, such as moving towards bundled
payments and capitation. Nonetheless, the effective-
ness of these efforts has been limited because of the
way they were implemented [57]. Hospitals cannot
retain the savings, when there is a balance and they
do not need to pay themselves when there is over-
spending [58].
Figure 2 presents the main actors and their linkages. A
red arrow indicates a perverse incentive and a blue
arrow means interventions, such as regulations and the
black arrow indicates a supply and demand relationship.
Fig. 2 Different actors in complexity system and their linkages
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Pressure on doctors by patients contributes to high
levels of antibiotic use. Some people ask for sophisti-
cated and expensive antibiotics or intravenous drips be-
cause they believe they are especially effective in curing
infectious diseases [10]. People may prefer some specific
drugs because of their experience. If a patient has recov-
ered from sickness after taking a certain drug, he or she
may ask the doctor to prescribe the same drug when
they have similar symptoms again [10]. Moreover, doc-
tors may be afraid of medical disputes and lawsuits, and
might use preventive antibiotics [59], in contradiction to
guidelines that state that antibiotics should not be used
as prophylactics except during surgery. In fact, use is
popular even if the patient just has a common cold [60].
With all these types of pressures combined with a per-
verse financial incentive system, doctors are more likely
to over-prescribe antibiotics because it can ensure their
income, prevent disputes and lawsuits, and satisfy the
patients.
Retail pharmacies are becoming an important source
of antibiotics. Most try to be an accredited supplier to
beneficiaries of medical insurance. Patients tend to pre-
fer retail pharmacies because they do not need to wait in
line for a doctor’s prescription and wait again at thehospital pharmacy [58]. The average availability of medi-
cines in retail pharmacies tends to be higher than in
public hospitals [61]. In 2004, the government issued a
regulation making antibiotics a prescription-only drug,
however, retail pharmacies often do not ask clients to
show a prescription [62]. Or, retail pharmacies can cir-
cumvent the regulation by employing a doctor to pre-
scribe antibiotics, as required [60]. Several studies have
found the percentage of antibiotics sold in retail pharma-
cies was high, and selling antibiotics without prescriptions
was widespread [63–65]. Moreover, many retail pharma-
cies do not provide advice by professional pharmacists
[66]. A study by Jiang [61] has shown that only 0.9 % of
pharmacies could provide completely correct guidance re-
garding antibiotic use.
Online pharmacies are becoming an important source of
antibiotics [67]. It is easy to buy antibiotics without a pre-
scription from online pharmacies. Mechanisms to supervise
online activities are not well-established and there is evi-
dence of a growing problem with the supply of fake drugs
through the internet [67, 68]. By June 2011, the FDA had
closed 709 fake-drug making or selling sites, the total
amount of which was approximately 0.7 billion RMB, and
70 % of the fake drugs were sold through the internet [69].
Regulating online drug supply is very much needed.
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action between doctors and patients, or between drug
stores and patients. In China, a large number of patients
are ignorant about antibiotics. Many people have never
heard of antibiotics but associate them with xiaoyanyao,
which actually consists of antipyretic-analgesic and anti-
inflammatory drugs, and steroid hormones. They are not
concerned with antimicrobial resistance and believe new
generations of antibiotics will be invented continuously
[10]. A cross-sectional study found that most parents in
rural areas had a low level of knowledge about antibiotics,
and self-medication for children was common [70]. Even
university students do not have adequate knowledge of
antibiotics, and the proportion of self-medication is high
[71]. Ignorance may lead patients to misunderstand “good
drugs or quality services” as these can cure illness quickly.
Common self-medication means a large number of people
will pursue antibiotics through drug stores (online or not).
Consequently, a strengthening behavior towards antibiotic
abuse by both providers (hospitals or drug stores) and pa-
tients will be seen.
Implications for the implementation of antibiotic
regulations and other strategies
Nonlinear results in the implementation process
Complexity can lead to unexpected consequences, which
means there may not be a simple linear relationship be-
tween the effect and implementation of regulations. In the-
ory, Government should make regulation policies, then
administrators and regulators monitor and supervise their
implementation. Meanwhile, health and medicine providers
should supply antibiotics rationally according to these regu-
lations. Finally, patients should accept the advice of these
providers and use antibiotics according to the guidelines.
The result should be the rational use of antibiotics. In prac-
tice, the implementation of regulations has resulted in a
series of nonlinear outcomes, due to the adaptive activities
of different agents, in protecting their interests. For ex-
ample, most of the regulations are aimed at changing the
behavior of doctors. However, the incentives the doctors
face have led many of them to promote consumption of
large volumes of expensive products. It will be difficult to
change behavior, without paying attention to these incen-
tives. The same applies to the rules that require pharmacies
to ask for a prescription. Several national health education
programs have been organized to improve people’s basic
health knowledge, such as ‘66 Items Related to Citizen’s
Health Literacy in China’ held in 2008 and revised in 2015
by NHDPC, and “Health China Propaganda Program” in
2013 hosted jointly by NHDPC, CFDA and CAST. Despite
these efforts, most people still know little about antibiotics.
Policy makers and regulators should not think their
job is done when policies and regulations are developed.
Without taking into account the various agents’ adaptivebehaviors and possible nonlinear results, to adjust the
specific implementation plans, the planned results will
not be achieved automatically.
Understanding interactive relationships between types of
agents
We identify two types of interactive relationship regarding
antibiotic use and regulation: one is the role of health ad-
ministration departments in both sponsoring and moni-
toring the performance of medical institutions; the other
is the strong supply-demand relationship between pro-
viders and consumers of antibiotics. The first relationship
could cause a lax implementation of regulations on anti-
biotic use. Health administration departments are under
pressure to ensure the financial health of hospitals and
also to oversee their prescription behavior. The second re-
lationship could increase the difficulty of regulation. Infor-
mation asymmetry is a nature of healthcare industry. This
may be more serious in China because of the population’s
low level of knowledge about antibiotics. Induced demand
from providers is widespread, and it is very hard to
supervise all sorts of over-prescription activities, because it
is time-consuming and costly.
Developing new pathways based on agent’s adaptive
behavior
Policy implementation is always influenced by the adaptive
responses of actors and their relationships [24]. For in-
stance, under the pressure of the low-price-regulation of
health services and the “15 % make-up policy”, doctors
have a financial incentive to over-prescribe antibiotics and
respond passively to regulations. The Government is now
trying to implement a zero mark-up policy, but Xiao and
her colleagues [24] found that hospitals have responded to
this policy by creating new incentives to provide high levels
of inpatient care. Jin et al. [55] found that doctors increased
intravenous services to compensate revenue when drug in-
come decreased due to the NEMP. It is necessary to antici-
pate possible range of behavioral responses in more
complex context, and to take consideration on interests of
all stakeholders.
Conclusion
Antibiotic regulations and other strategies have been de-
veloped continuously in the last ten years, but high levels
of antibiotic use have persisted and the problem of resist-
ance has grown worse. The effectiveness of policy imple-
mentation is limited due to the complexity of China’s
health system. Various agents with different objectives and
in multiple interactive relationships are involved in policy
implementation and have adapted to changes that affect
their interests. Using complex adaptive system framework
to better understand each type of agents’ interests, re-
sponses, and their adaptive behaviors could help us to
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the issue of high levels of antibiotic use and antimicrobial
resistance.
The paper maps out the agents, their incentives and
behaviors from the perspective of complex adaptive sys-
tem. Based on the above analysis, we have identified four
key routes in changing the antibiotic use and antimicro-
bial resistance situation.
One route is to alter finance incentives in secondary and
tertiary hospitals. In 2012, secondary hospitals treated 1.055
billion outpatients and tertiary hospitals treated 1.087
billion; 41.5 % and 42.7 % of the total, respectively [49].
The second route is to address adaptive behaviors in
primary health facilities after the “zero mark-up” inter-
vention. Changing the financing structure of the primary
health facilities to reduce the strong incentives of selling
drugs is essential.
The third route is to provide effective health education,
especially to inform rural residents about antibiotics and
antimicrobial resistance. And the last route is pay atten-
tion to the large number of informal suppliers of antibi-
otics outside the formal regulation system, especially
through measures to regulate online suppliers of drugs.
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